Full Report

The numbers behind PT Paramita Bangun Sarana Tbk: as-reported financial statements and company metrics for FY2021–FY2025, traced to the source filings, opened with the share-price history those statements have to justify. Every linked figure opens the exact page of the filing it was printed on, with the statement row highlighted. Amounts in IDR millions unless noted.

Reading notes: Rendered from standardized data feeds only — the statement extractor did not produce a verified extraction this run, so figures carry no page links.

Share Price — Available History Since January 2026

The stock closed at IDR 775 on Jul 24, 2026 — down 67% over the window shown, trading between IDR 605 and IDR 2,360. At that close the stock trades at 7.3× FY2025 diluted EPS as reported below.

Source: market price feed, daily closes, Jan 2026–Jul 2026 — the feed marks this available history as partial. Price return only, excludes dividends.

FY2025 at a Glance

Source: standardized company data feed — these figures carry no page links.

Income Statement

Income Statement	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Total revenue	279,155	731,846	572,763	1,154,290	1,591,239
Operating income	82,892	148,028	111,473	191,486	243,023
Pre-tax income	92,500	151,859	243,479	241,932	360,913
Net income	83,316	133,988	192,742	215,043	320,081
Diluted EPS	27.87	44.56	64.28	71.53	106.61
Total revenue growth, derived	—	+162.2%	-21.7%	+101.5%	+37.9%

Source: standardized company data feed — these figures carry no page links.

Balance Sheet

Balance Sheet	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Cash and equivalents	157,896	178,201	171,118	81,065	145,223
Total assets	776,988	857,819	795,622	1,117,112	1,421,979
Total liabilities	195,989	212,407	198,464	341,624	492,746

Source: standardized company data feed — these figures carry no page links.

Cash Flow

Cash Flow	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Operating cash flow	42,314	203,041	200,456	(43,068)	367,032
Capital expenditure	23,894	35,980	46,913	27,878	16,561
Free cash flow	18,420	167,060	153,543	(70,946)	350,470

Source: standardized company data feed — these figures carry no page links.

Long-Term Record

Fiscal year	Total revenue	Operating income	Net income	Diluted EPS
FY2016	1,269,538	154,216	123,591	96.93
FY2017	630,067	105,428	96,580	64.39
FY2018	358,691	32,401	42,264	28.18
FY2019	607,764	34,133	13,287	9.05
FY2020	552,602	53,832	43,152	28.75
FY2021	279,155	82,892	83,316	27.87
FY2022	731,846	148,028	133,988	44.56
FY2023	572,763	111,473	192,742	64.28
FY2024	1,154,290	191,486	215,043	71.53
FY2025	1,591,239	243,023	320,081	106.61

Source: standardized company data feed — these figures carry no page links.

Analyst Consensus

Street ratings: No sell-side analyst coverage. PBSA (PT Paramita Bangun Sarana Tbk, IDX/PBSA.JK) is a small-cap Indonesian construction company with 0 covering analysts per Simply Wall St, and no consensus price target or buy/hold/sell rating on Yahoo Finance or stockanalysis.com. No mean analyst price target exists (0 is a placeholder for 'not available'). Only quantitative/model fair-value estimates are published (e.g., Simply Wall St model fair value ~IDR 331.5), which are not sell-side ratings.

Estimate source: analyst consensus (claude_web), as of 2026-07-24. Forecasts carry no filing page links.

Traceability

0 of 95 figures on this page (0%) link to the filing page where they are printed — click a linked figure to open the source PDF at that page with the row highlighted. Unlinked figures come from standardized data feeds or pre-filing years.

• Rendered from standardized data feeds only — the statement extractor did not produce a verified extraction this run, so figures carry no page links.

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PT Paramita Bangun Sarana Tbk's management explains the business in its own materials. The slides below do the most of that work, pulled from the documents preserved in Sources. Each source link opens the complete presentation at that slide in a new tab.

Annual Report 2025 — FY2025

PBSA publishes no investor deck; this annual report is its fullest self-description — what it builds, where, its revenue mix, ownership, targets and dividends. · Open the full document →

More from management

Annual Report 2024 — FY2024 · 303 pages · The prior-year edition — same company-profile visuals plus the 2024 figures that are the base for 2025's growth. · Open →

Q1 FY2026 Results — Q1 FY2026 · 110 pages · The most recent quarterly numbers — interim financial statements, not an explanatory deck. · Open →

IPO Prospectus (2016) — 2016 IPO · 192 pages · The listing prospectus — founding-era business description, client concentration and the risk factors laid out at IPO. · Open →

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PT Paramita Bangun Sarana Tbk's annual reports contain management's most considered account of the business. These are the sections, passages and visual pages worth opening in the originals preserved in Sources.

PT Paramita Bangun Sarana Tbk — FY2025 Annual Report — FY2025

The latest and most complete account of the business — record FY2025 results, the palm-oil-refinery demand engine, and the segment economics that sit beneath the headline growth. · Open the full document →

Financial Highlights Charts — p. 7 · Read the full section →

The three-year trajectory at a glance: revenue, profit, assets and equity all rising into 2025.

Board of Directors Report — p. 13 · Read the full section →

Management's own read on 2025 — what drove the year and where it is steering the business into 2026.

The demand engine: palm-oil refinery construction, tied to government downstreaming policy.

One of the subsectors that recorded significant growth was the development of palm oil processing facilities (refineries), driven by rising demand for value-added derivative products and the strengthening of downstreaming policies by the Government. This condition has increased the need for construction services with capabilities to handle highly complex industrial projects, including the integration of civil, mechanical, and electrical works.

p. 13 · Read in context →

FY2025 results in management's words: revenue +37.85% to Rp1,591bn, net profit Rp320bn.

During the 2025 financial year, the Company successfully recorded significant revenue growth of Rp1,591.24 billion, an increase of approximately 37,85% compared to 2024’s Rp1,154.29 billion. […] In line with this performance, the Company recorded profit for the year of Rp320.08 billion, an increase from Rp215.04 billion in 2024.

p. 14 · Read in context →

Business Activities — p. 31 · Read the full section →

What the company actually does — civil, mechanical and electrical construction, with a stated concentration in palm oil.

Core competencies and the palm-oil-sector focus that concentrates the order book.

In conducting its business activities, the Company has extensive experience in civil construction, mechanical and electrical works, as well as land clearing activities. Such expertise has been particularly applied to projects related to the palm oil industry sector, which require technical readiness, timeliness, and well-coordinated projec management.

p. 32 · Read in context →

Business Segment Overview — p. 57 · Read the full section →

How the revenue is built: one segment carries the business, the others are supporting.

Revenue mix: construction 91.6%, trading 8.4%, building management immaterial.

The construction segment remained the largest contributor, generating Rp1,457.63 billion or approximately 91.6% of total revenue. […] The trading segment contributed Rp133.14 billion or approximately 8.4% of total revenue, serving as a supporting segment primarily related to project material supply. Meanwhile, the building management segment contributed Rp471.88 million, representing a relatively small portion of total revenue, but still forming part of the Company’s service diversification.

p. 57 · Read in context →

Dividend Policy — p. 66 · Read the full section →

A consistently high payout — a defining feature of the equity story for income-minded holders.

Revenue Recognition (Note 3q) — p. 187 · Read the full section →

The accounting that defines the model — construction revenue booked over time on physical progress.

Percentage-of-completion (output method), with full and immediate provisioning for expected contract losses.

Revenues related to construction contracts are accounted for using the percentage of completion method. Under this method, the revenue recognized equals the latest estimate of the total value of the contract multiplied by the actual completion rate determined by reference to the physical state of progress of the works (output method). […] If it is regarded as probable that a contract will generate a loss on completion, a provision for expected losses to completion is recognized as a current provision in the consolidated financial statements. The loss is provided for in full as soon as it can be reliably measured, irrespective of the completion rate.

p. 189 · Read in context →

Segment Information (Note 37) — p. 249 · Read the full section →

The audited segment P&L — and where it shows that a large slice of FY2025 profit is investment fair-value gains, not construction.

More annual reports

PT Paramita Bangun Sarana Tbk — FY2024 Annual Report — FY2024 · 303 pages · The prior year and comparison base — revenue Rp1,154bn, before the FY2025 step-up in scale. · Open →

PT Paramita Bangun Sarana Tbk — FY2023 Annual Report — FY2023 · 260 pages · A quieter year (revenue Rp573bn) that frames how sharply the business scaled afterward. · Open →

PT Paramita Bangun Sarana Tbk — FY2022 Annual Report — FY2022 · 268 pages · Earlier baseline for the order book and dividend track record. · Open →

PT Paramita Bangun Sarana Tbk — FY2021 Annual Report — FY2021 · 262 pages · The oldest edition on file — useful for the longer-run view of margins and payout. · Open →

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Two engines behind a record year

PT Paramita Bangun Sarana (PBSA) is a small, debt-free Indonesian contractor that builds palm-oil mills, refineries and jetties, almost entirely for companies in the Sinar Mas and Golden Agri palm-oil group. Its FY2025 profit of Rp320bn was a record, but roughly a third of pretax profit came not from construction — it came from unrealized gains on a Rp328bn portfolio of managed funds. This chapter maps the business and fixes the question the report is built to answer.

What PBSA is

Paramita Bangun Sarana was founded on 27 November 2002 and listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange on 28 September 2016, selling 300 million new shares [1]. It is a construction contractor whose expertise has been "particularly applied to projects related to the palm oil industry" — building the roads into plantations, the mills, the refineries, the tank farms and the jetties that move crude palm oil onto ships [2]. Around this core sits a small trading arm and a negligible building-management unit; construction was about 85% of FY2024 revenue.

That palm-oil focus is also a concentration. Every customer that individually exceeded 10% of FY2025 revenue belongs to the same industrial group: PT Sinar Mas Agro Resources and Technology, PT Soci Mas, PT Binasawit Abadipratama, PT Ivomas Tunggal and PT Sumber Indah Perkasa [3]. PBSA's order book, in other words, rises and falls with one ecosystem's decision to build palm-oil processing capacity.

Ownership is equally concentrated. Two private holding companies — PT Ascend Bangun Persada (46.16%) and PT Sigma Mutiara (37.56%) — hold 83.7% of the 3.0 billion shares between them, leaving a public float of 16.28% [4]. A thin float matters later, when the share price is discussed.

Source: FY2025 Annual Report, Financial Highlights [5] and Consolidated Statement of Profit or Loss [6]; ROE derived from reported net profit and equity.

The construction engine is lumpy

Project-based contracting does not compound smoothly, and PBSA's does not. Revenue has swung from Rp1,270bn in 2016 — the year it went public — down to a Rp279bn trough in 2021, then up to a fresh record of Rp1,591bn in 2025 [7]. A single large mill or tank-farm contract landing or completing in a given year moves the whole top line.

Source: reported consolidated income statements, FY2016–FY2025, per the FY2025 Annual Report three-year summary [8] and earlier filings.

The balance sheet that carries this volatility is unusually clean. At end-2025 PBSA held Rp145bn of cash and Rp328bn of short-term investments against total debt of about Rp19m — effectively no borrowings — on Rp929bn of equity [9]. Reported returns are high: FY2025 return on equity was 34% and the operating margin 15%.

Cash generation, though, is as lumpy as revenue. In FY2024 the company reported Rp215bn of net profit yet burned Rp43bn of operating cash as receivables and contract assets built up; in FY2025 operating cash flow swung to a positive Rp367bn [10]. Over a full cycle the cash arrives, but in any single year reported profit and cash can point in opposite directions — a working-capital pattern normal for percentage-of-completion contractors, and one worth watching in the years it diverges.

The second engine is a securities portfolio

The more distinctive feature of recent results sits below the operating line. In FY2025, operating income was Rp243bn, but profit before tax was Rp361bn — a Rp118bn gap [11]. Almost all of that gap is one line: a Rp111.5bn "gain on fair value change on investments" (Rp38.7bn in FY2024). It is an unrealized mark-to-market gain, not a sale, and it equals 31% of FY2025 pretax profit.

Source: FY2025 Annual Report, Consolidated Statement of Profit or Loss [12] and Financial Highlights [13]; non-operating income is profit before tax less operating income.

This non-operating engine is new at scale. The portfolio behind it — classified as "financial assets at fair value through profit or loss, held-for-trading" — grew from Rp89bn at end-2024 to Rp328bn at end-2025, nearly a quarter of total assets. It holds mostly managed funds: Nusadana Fixed Income, KPD Nusadana, Juara Capital and Nusadana Balanced Fund, plus a token equity stake [14]. One holding drives much of the gain: KPD Nusadana, a discretionary managed account, was revalued from Rp883.68 to Rp2,533.33 per unit over 2025 — a 187% mark-up on an unchanged 46.3 million units [15].

That is a large, illiquid, marked-to-model position contributing nearly a third of headline profit, and it deserves its own forensic look before the recent earnings trajectory is taken at face value. The pattern is not a one-off — the operating-to-pretax gap was even wider in FY2023, at Rp132bn — which makes the durability of these gains a live question rather than a footnote.

The stock: a thin float, a spike, and a round-trip

For most of its listed life PBSA traded as a sleepy micro-cap. Quarter-end closes sat between Rp280 and Rp370 through 2024. Then, in the second half of 2025, the shares moved sharply: the third-quarter close was Rp985 and the fourth-quarter close Rp1,500, with an intraday high of Rp2,160, lifting market capitalization to Rp4.5tn at year-end [16]. The exchange suspended trading in the stock for eleven days in September 2025 [17]. The move had the fingerprints of a thin-float re-rating rather than a change in the business.

Sources: quarter-end closes FY2024–FY2025 from the FY2025 Annual Report [18]; the July 2026 price is the latest market quote.

The spike has since reversed. The shares peaked near Rp2,360 in late January 2026 and, by 24 July 2026, had fallen to Rp775 — a round-trip that leaves the stock roughly where a fundamental investor might start. No sell-side analyst covers PBSA, so there is no consensus to anchor to. At Rp775 the market values the equity near Rp2.3tn, or about 7 times FY2025 earnings and 2.5 times book — cheap on trailing figures, but those figures include the portfolio gains discussed above, and the "earnings" they capitalize are partly a mark-to-market opinion.

The question this report answers

PBSA presents a genuine puzzle. It is a debt-free, cash-rich, high-return contractor trading at a single-digit trailing multiple with no analyst coverage — the profile value investors hunt for. It is also a contractor whose revenue depends on one industrial group's capex cycle, whose reported cash lags reported profit in the years they diverge, and whose record earnings have been lifted roughly a third by unrealized gains on a securities book that quadrupled in a year.

So the question the chapters that follow are built to answer is this: whether PBSA's record FY2024–25 profits represent a durable, repeatable construction franchise worth its modest multiple — or a lumpy, customer-concentrated contractor whose headline earnings have been flattered to record levels by unrealized portfolio gains, leaving a buyer paying for profit that construction alone did not earn. Everything that follows tests one side of that question or the other.

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Earnings Quality

Over FY2023–FY2025, roughly a third of PBSA's record pretax profit came not from building things but from investment results: a one-time Rp165bn stake sale in 2023, then growing marks on a fund portfolio that reached Rp328bn. FY2025's Rp111.5bn fair-value gain — 31% of pretax — is an unrealized, non-cash mark on Nusadana-managed funds. Strip the investment line and construction-only earnings per share is about Rp68, against the reported Rp106.61 [1].

The chapter Two Profit Engines named the second engine. This one takes it apart: what the investment income actually is, how much of it is cash, how much is taxed, and what the construction business earns on its own.

The gap between operating and reported profit

For most of PBSA's listed history, operating income and pretax profit tracked each other closely — the company earned what it built. That link broke in FY2023 and has not been restored. In FY2023, pretax profit of Rp243.5bn was more than double the Rp111.5bn the construction operation produced; in FY2025, operating income of Rp243.0bn carried up to a pretax figure of Rp360.9bn [2].

Source: consolidated income statements as reported; FY2023 per Annual Report 2023 [3] and FY2024–FY2025 per Annual Report 2025 [4]; FY2019–FY2022 from company filings.

The wedge between the two bars is non-operating income, and it is almost entirely investment income. It was 54% of pretax profit in FY2023, 21% in FY2024, and 33% in FY2025. Summed across the three years, investment results delivered about Rp290bn of a cumulative Rp846bn of pretax profit — a third of the total — in a business whose reported story is construction for the palm-oil industry.

Two different investment engines

The label "investment income" hides two very different things, and the distinction is the heart of the earnings-quality question.

FY2023 — a real, cash, taxed windfall. The Rp165.1bn "gain on sale of investments" that dominated FY2023 was the disposal of PBSA's 10% stake in PT EcoOils Jaya Indonesia, a palm-oil-linked venture it had built up from 2018. It sold the entire 24,000-share holding in October 2023 for USD 13.75mn, equivalent to Rp216.0bn [5]. This was a genuine, arm's-length cash exit that multiplied the original outlay several times over — a well-executed strategic investment. It was also taxed like one: FY2023 income tax jumped to Rp38.9bn, from Rp0.1bn a year earlier [6]. In the same year, the separate trading portfolio actually lost Rp38.3bn on fair-value marks [7]. The windfall was real; it was also, by definition, not repeatable.

FY2024–FY2025 — unrealized marks on a fund book. What replaced the EcoOils gain is different in kind. The Rp111.5bn that supplied 31% of FY2025 pretax profit is a "gain on fair value change on investments" — an unrealized mark-to-value adjustment on a held-for-trading portfolio, recognized in profit whether or not anything is sold [8]. Realized gains on actual sales were only Rp5.7bn [9]. Ninety-five percent of the FY2025 investment result never touched a buyer.

Source: FY2023 income statement [10] and FY2025 income statement [11]. FY2023 realized gain is the EcoOils stake sale.

What the portfolio holds, and how it is valued

The short-term investment line grew from Rp88.9bn to Rp327.8bn during FY2025 and now equals 23% of total assets [12]. All but Rp0.85bn of it is mutual-fund units and a discretionary managed account, valued at manager-reported net asset value per unit rather than exchange-quoted prices. Only one holding — a Rp0.85bn stake in PT Indah Kiat Pulp and Paper — carries a market share price [13].

Source: FY2025 Annual Report, Note 11 Short-Term Investments [14].

Two features of this book deserve a professional reader's attention.

First, the marks are large and are set on units the company already owned. KPD Nusadana — a Kontrak Pengelolaan Dana, a bilateral discretionary managed-account mandate rather than a publicly traded fund — was carried at Rp883.68 per unit at end-2024 and Rp2,533.33 per unit at end-2025, a 187% rise, on an unchanged 46,255,167 units [15]. Juara Capital's unit value rose 133% over the same year. Nearly a third of pretax profit rests on the NAVs assigned to these vehicles.

Second, the manager. Three of the four funds — Nusadana Fixed Income, KPD Nusadana, and Nusadana Balanced Fund — carry the Nusadana name and together hold Rp271.8bn, or 83% of the portfolio [16]. Two of PBSA's own board members held senior positions at Nusadana group entities: Director Evelyn Tanuwidjaja was Finance Director of PT Nusadana Capital Indonesia [17], and President Commissioner Halim Susanto was President Director of PT OSK Nusadana Securities Indonesia and President Commissioner of PT Nusadana Capital Indonesia [18]. The company discloses these holdings as third-party, and the board roles ended over a decade ago, so this is not a disclosed related-party transaction. But when the funds setting a third of reported profit share a name with vehicles two directors once ran, an investor is entitled to ask how independent the NAVs that drive earnings really are.

Cash and tax: the paper gains are both

For all the weight the fair-value line carries in profit, it is absent from cash flow — and that cuts both ways.

FY2025 operating cash flow was a strong Rp367.0bn, built from Rp1,715.6bn of cash collected from construction customers, which exceeded the year's revenue as receivables were drawn down [19]. None of that came from the portfolio. On the contrary, PBSA was a net buyer, placing Rp121.7bn of fresh cash into short-term investments during the year [20]. So the reassuring part: FY2025's construction core genuinely converted to cash, and the year's large Rp165bn dividend was funded by operations, not by liquidating the fund book. The uncomfortable part: the Rp111.5bn that lifted headline profit is money the company has not received and, on current behaviour, is not trying to receive.

The prior year shows the same point from the other side. In FY2024, PBSA reported Rp215.0bn of net profit but operating cash flow of negative Rp43.1bn as working capital absorbed cash [21]. Reported earnings and cash have diverged sharply in both directions.

Tax tells a parallel story. Because the FY2025 fair-value gain is unrealized, it is untaxed: the income statement carries a Rp39.7bn final tax levied on construction revenue and only Rp1.1bn of income tax, against Rp360.9bn of pretax profit [22]. That is not aggressive accounting — it is how Indonesia taxes construction revenue and unrealized gains. But it means the Rp111.5bn mark carries an unbooked tax cost on the day it is realized. The scale of that cost is not hypothetical: in FY2024, when PBSA did harvest part of the book, it paid Rp38.8bn of cash tax on investment sales [23].

Construction-only earnings

Removing the investment result leaves what the contracting business earns on its own. Stripping the unrealized fair-value gain and the small realized gain from FY2025 net profit takes Rp320.1bn down to about Rp202.9bn, and reported EPS of Rp106.61 down to roughly Rp67.6 [24].

Source: derived from FY2025 reported income statement; investment gains per Note 11 [25].

Source: FY2025 Annual Report, income statement and Note 11 [26] [27].

Construction-only EPS of about Rp67.6 is still a record for the company and still cash-backed, so this is not a case of a hollow business dressed up by a portfolio. It is a case of a headline number that overstates the repeatable one by roughly a third. A valuation multiple placed on Rp106.61 is a very different thing from the same multiple placed on Rp67.6.

Two caveats keep this measure honest. The construction line itself rests on percentage-of-completion revenue, which PBSA's auditor flags as a Key Audit Matter every year — earned-but-unbilled contract assets and retention receivables together stood at Rp288bn at end-2025 [28] [29]. And the investment gains, while low-quality as earnings, are not fictitious: the FY2023 EcoOils exit proves the company can turn an investment into real cash, and FY2025's construction cash collection was strong.

What would change the read

The investment income is genuine profit under the accounting rules and has, at least once, become genuine cash. The concern is quality, not existence: a third of the record depends on unrealized marks, concentrated in Nusadana-managed vehicles, that would swing back through the income statement in a down year exactly as they swung up — FY2023's Rp38.3bn fair-value loss is the reminder. The read would ease if PBSA redeems a meaningful slice of the fund book at or above carrying value, or discloses the funds' underlying holdings and valuation basis; it would harden if the marks keep climbing without redemptions, or if a weak year reveals how much of the NAV was ever realizable. For any forward estimate, the construction-only figure — near Rp68 of EPS — is the more defensible base, with the portfolio treated as a separate, volatile asset rather than an earnings stream.

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Palm Oil Capex

The construction earnings the report has isolated as PBSA's durable base are genuine and growing — revenue reached Rp1,591bn in FY2025 and construction operating income has compounded through FY2026. But that base rides one industrial ecosystem: every customer above 10% of revenue, and every disclosed contract in the order book, is a Sinar Mas / Golden Agri palm-oil entity. The engine is real; its fuel is one conglomerate's downstream capex cycle.

The construction engine is real, and it is growing

Earlier chapters separated PBSA's two profit sources (Two Profit Engines) and stripped the investment marks out of headline profit (Earnings Quality), leaving a construction-only base of roughly Rp203bn net and about Rp67.6 EPS. The first question for durability is whether that base is itself growing or stalling. It is growing.

Source: FY2022 Annual Report, Management Discussion and Analysis [1] (FY2021–FY2022); FY2024 Annual Report, Management Discussion and Analysis [2] (FY2023); FY2025 Annual Report, Management Discussion and Analysis [3] (FY2024–FY2025).

Revenue climbed 162% in FY2022 to Rp731.85bn [4], fell back to Rp572.76bn in FY2023 [5], then doubled again — up 101.5% in FY2024 to Rp1,154.29bn [6] and a further 37.85% in FY2025 to Rp1,591.24bn [7]. The path is not smooth — a doubling, a 22% fall, then two years of surge — which is the signature of a project contractor whose top line moves with the timing of a handful of large jobs rather than a steady book of recurring work.

Source: FY2025 Annual Report, Business Segment Overview [8].

Construction is 91.6% of FY2025 revenue at Rp1,457.63bn; a trading segment (project-material supply) adds Rp133.14bn and building management is negligible [9]. The company is, in substance, a single-line industrial-construction contractor.

One ecosystem: the customers and the order book

The concentration is not a matter of degree. For both FY2025 and FY2024, every customer whose cumulative billings individually exceeded 10% of revenue was a Sinar Mas / Golden Agri palm-oil entity: PT Sinar Mas Agro Resources and Technology (SMART), PT Soci Mas, PT Binasawit Abadipratama, PT Ivomas Tunggal, and PT Sumber Indah Perkasa [10]. There is no meaningful revenue line outside that group.

The order book says the same thing. PBSA does not publish a single backlog figure, but Note 34 of the FY2024 accounts lists every ongoing contract above Rp10bn — 17 of them, worth about Rp651bn in aggregate. Grouped by owner, all of it is the palm-oil ecosystem:

Source: FY2024 Annual Report, Note 34 Significant Agreements and Commitments [11].

Every project is a palm-oil facility: upper-structure storage tanks at Lubuk Gaung and Lampung, a jetty and land grading at Bagendang, a refinery expansion at Marunda, palm-kernel-expeller warehouses at Dumai, a fractionation retrofit at Belawan [12]. The customers are the anchor tenants of Indonesia's palm-oil supply chain, and PBSA builds the tanks, terminals, and refineries they need to process and move the oil.

Source: FY2024 Annual Report, Note 34 Significant Agreements and Commitments [13].

Two features of this book matter as much as its concentration. First, it is short-dated: every contract listed at end-2024 matured within 2025, and the six contracts disclosed a year later all mature during 2026 [14]. There is no multi-year backlog cushioning revenue; the book turns over roughly annually, which is why the top line can double or fall by a fifth from one year to the next. Second, the disclosure itself thinned: the FY2024 note reported 17 contracts above Rp10bn with values attached, while the FY2025 note reports only six above Rp30bn and drops the contract values [15]. A reader loses the ability to size forward work precisely at exactly the point the numbers grew largest.

What drives the fuel, and what could refill it

The work is tied to a specific capital cycle. Management frames its own demand as the government's hilirisasi (downstream-industrialisation) push, which pulls palm-oil processing onshore and drives construction of refineries and their supporting infrastructure [16]. The FY2025 growth is attributed directly to "increased demand for the development and procurement of palm oil mill facilities" [17]. That cycle — refining, fractionation, and bulking capacity built out to feed export demand and Indonesia's rising biodiesel blending mandate — is real and, for now, expanding. It is also outside PBSA's control: it turns on palm-oil economics and one group's investment appetite, neither of which the company influences.

Management's stated answer to the concentration is diversification — targeting new contracts in industrial estates, manufacturing, and energy, and building out Mechanical/Electrical/Plumbing and Engineering-Procurement-Construction (EPC) lines to widen the addressable work and lift project values [18]. The intent is credible but unproven in the numbers: the trading and building-management segments remain small, and even the nearest thing to a non-palm customer in the current book — an IKK building-expansion job for PT Indah Kiat Pulp and Paper — sits inside the same Sinar Mas group [19]. Diversification is a plan, not yet a fact.

The freshest read: the engine is repeating, the headline is not

The clearest test of durability is the most recent quarter, and it cuts in PBSA's favour on the operating line. In Q1 FY2026 revenue rose 46.8% year on year to Rp410.57bn and operating income rose 59.8% to Rp81.34bn — the construction engine visibly accelerating [20].

Source: Q1 FY2026 Interim Financial Statements, Statement of Profit or Loss [21].

Yet net profit fell 94% to Rp1.47bn, because the investment book swung to an unrealized fair-value loss of Rp71.62bn in the quarter [22]. The same portfolio that supplied roughly a third of FY2025 pretax profit reversed and erased almost all of a quarter in which the core business grew nearly 60% at the operating line. For the durability question this is the cleanest evidence available: the construction franchise is repeating and compounding, while the reported bottom line is being driven by something else entirely.

What would change the read

The measured view: PBSA runs a genuine, growing, cash-generative construction franchise, but its durability rests on the continued downstream investment of the Sinar Mas / Golden Agri complex, and its reported earnings will stay volatile as long as a large trading portfolio sits on top of it. The strongest fact for the bulls is the operating record — two years of surging revenue and a 60% jump in Q1 FY2026 operating income show the ecosystem is still building and PBSA is still winning the work, plausibly a trusted-vendor position a decade in the making. The strongest fact against is that none of this is diversified: a pause in palm-oil downstream capex, or a decision by the group to use another contractor, would hit revenue with roughly annual notice and no backlog cushion.

Three things would move the read. A first material contract from a customer outside the Sinar Mas / Golden Agri ecosystem — energy, industrial estates, or third-party EPC — would begin to convert the diversification plan into fact. A lengthening of the order book beyond its current ~12-month horizon would reduce the revenue lumpiness that has defined the last decade. And a sustained downturn in CPO economics or a stall in Indonesia's downstream build-out would be the clearest signal that the fuel is running low. Until one of those appears, the construction engine should be read as real but singular: repeatable only for as long as one group keeps investing.

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Capital and Control

PBSA returns most of its construction cash to shareholders — a dividend every year, payout ratios of 77–90% of profit, and a per-share payment that has climbed from Rp40 to Rp60. But the cash flows to a control block that owns 83.7%, and the board that directs both the payout and the Rp328bn securities portfolio has one independent member out of five. The capital-return record is real and cash-backed; control over how that cash is used is close to absolute.

A high, rising, cash-backed dividend

PBSA has paid a cash dividend in every year of its listed life, and has raised the per-share amount steadily as profits grew. The company's own record shows dividends paid in 2023, 2024 and 2025 of Rp120bn, Rp159bn and Rp165bn — Rp40, Rp53 and Rp55 per share — representing 89.6%, 82.5% and 76.7% of the prior year's net income [1]. The FY2024 profit was distributed as Rp165bn, or Rp55 per share, at a 76.73% payout ratio approved at the June 2025 AGM and paid on 17 July 2025 [2].

Sources: dividend totals and per-share amounts, FY2025 Annual Report Note 25 [3]; FY2025 dividend of Rp60/share per the June 2026 declaration [4]; net income per reported financials [5].

The FY2023 dividend of Rp159bn (Rp53 per share) was itself split into a Rp120bn interim paid in December 2023 and a Rp39bn final paid in July 2024; the FY2024 dividend of Rp165bn followed in July 2025 [6]. This is not new behaviour reaching back only to the profit surge: the company paid Rp19.5bn, Rp49.5bn and Rp40.5bn in 2019–2021, at a time when annual profit was a fraction of today's [7]. The dividend is funded by construction cash, not the portfolio: as the Earnings Quality chapter established, FY2025 operating cash flow of Rp367bn came entirely from construction collections, comfortably covering the payout.

The FY2025 payout tells you what management thinks the profit is

The most recent declaration is the revealing one. Against reported FY2025 net profit of Rp320.1bn — a record, and reported earnings per share of Rp106.61 [8] — the board declared a dividend of Rp180bn, or Rp60 per share, a payout ratio of 55.95% [9]. That is the lowest ratio in the series, and on its face it looks like a retreat from the 77–90% payouts of prior years.

It is not. The FY2025 headline carried a Rp111.5bn unrealized fair-value gain on the securities portfolio — roughly a third of pretax profit — which the Earnings Quality chapter stripped out to leave a construction-only profit of about Rp202.9bn. Measured against that durable base, the Rp180bn dividend is an ~89% payout, squarely inside the historical band. The board sized the distribution to what construction earned and left the paper gains on the balance sheet. Management's own hand, in other words, treats the marks as non-distributable — the clearest confirmation yet that the record headline is not the cash engine.

Where the surplus actually goes

With no bank debt to repay and a business that consumes little fixed capital, PBSA's surplus has three destinations, in order of size: the dividend, the securities portfolio, and — newly, and modestly — a share buyback. The portfolio grew to Rp327.8bn by end-2025, larger than the year's dividend and roughly a third of equity; the Two Profit Engines and Earnings Quality chapters covered its composition and marks. What the capital-allocation lens adds is that the portfolio doubles as a liquidity reserve, not just an earnings line.

The first quarter of FY2026 shows the mechanism. Construction is lumpy in cash as well as in profit: Q1 FY2026 operating cash flow was negative Rp106.0bn, as payments to suppliers (Rp375.8bn) outran collections from customers (Rp312.7bn). To fund the quarter's outflows — including the buyback — the company sold Rp50bn of short-term investments, and cash fell from Rp145.2bn to Rp64.4bn [10]. The portfolio is therefore working capital as much as it is a bet: a store of value the company draws down when construction's working-capital cycle swings against it. That is a more benign reading of the Rp328bn than a pure marked-to-model speculation — and a reason the position is unlikely to shrink.

The buyback is the new element. On 2 February 2026 PBSA announced a programme to repurchase up to Rp100bn of stock from internal cash [11], and between 3 February and 17 March 2026 it bought 15,113,700 shares [12]. The cash actually spent was Rp19.3bn [13] — under a fifth of the authorised ceiling, at an average of about Rp1,276 per share, and equal to just 0.5% of the share count. Against a stock that has since fallen to Rp775, the repurchase is currently underwater; it reads as a small confidence signal after the price collapse rather than a material return of capital.

The share price ran 6x, then the exchange stepped in

None of the capital-return discipline prevented an extraordinary episode in the stock. PBSA traded around Rp364–370 through the first half of 2025, valuing the company near Rp1.1tn. It then ran to a Q3 high of Rp1,145 and a Q4 high of Rp2,160, closing 2025 at Rp1,500 for a market capitalisation of Rp4.5tn [14].

Source: FY2025 Annual Report, Share Performance Highlights [15].

The move had no corporate cause. The company states plainly that in 2025 it undertook no corporate action affecting its capital structure — no split, no bonus issue, no rights offering [16]. The Indonesia Stock Exchange suspended the shares from 11 to 22 September 2025, in its own words "in response to market regulatory dynamics as well as a significant cumulative increase in the Company's share price, as part of a cooling down measure and to protect investors' interests" [17]. The setup is the classic one for a thin-float Indonesian small-cap: with only about 16% of the stock in public hands, modest speculative buying can move the price violently. The unwind has been just as sharp — the shares changed hands at roughly Rp2,330–2,440 in late January 2026 and at Rp775 by 24 July 2026, some 64% below the Rp2,160 peak. The work of valuing the construction business and the portfolio as separate assets is left to a later chapter; the point here is that the price, not the business, did the round trip.

Sources: dividend per share and payout [18]; ownership [19]; price fall from Rp2,160 peak to Rp775 on 24 July 2026, per share-performance disclosure [20].

Who receives the cash, and who decides

Every rupiah of dividend is distributed pro-rata, and the register is dominated by two holding companies. As at 31 March 2026, PT Ascend Bangun Persada owned 46.16% and PT Sigma Mutiara 37.56% — a combined 83.72% — with the public holding the rest and one director, Alexander Sayidiman, registered for 800 shares [21].

Source: Q1 FY2026 Consolidated Financial Statements, Note 21 Share Capital, as at 31 March 2026 [22].

The arithmetic of the payout follows from that register. The FY2023–FY2025 dividends total roughly Rp504bn, of which about Rp420bn flowed to the two controlling holding companies. The high payout, in that light, is the mechanism by which the controllers convert the fortress balance sheet into cash for themselves — legitimately and pro-rata, which also means minority holders are paid alongside them on the same terms. That pro-rata alignment is the reassuring half of the concentration: the controllers take their return the same way outside shareholders do, through the dividend, rather than through related-party dealing. Note that the small buyback was funded from public float — the public stake fell from 16.28% to 15.78% as the treasury shares were absorbed [23] — so the controllers' effective share of the company edged up without their buying a single share.

The less reassuring half is the thinness of the outside check. The board has five members under Indonesia's two-tier structure, and only one — Independent Commissioner Roesdiman Soegiarso, who also chairs the Audit Committee — is independent [24]. The President Commissioner (Halim Susanto) and President Director (Vincentius Susanto) share a surname; the Finance Director, Evelyn Tanuwidjaja, is a former executive of Nusadana Capital — the fund group whose vehicles hold 83% of the securities portfolio the Earnings Quality chapter examined. Control of the payout and control of the marks sit with the same small circle, and the executives own almost no stock directly, so their alignment runs through the holding companies rather than personal equity in the listed shares.

Executive pay is not the concern it sometimes is in controlled companies. FY2025 key-management compensation was Rp3.35bn for the directors and Rp0.77bn for the commissioners — about Rp4.1bn combined, or roughly 1.3% of net profit, entirely in cash with no stock or option awards [25]. The controllers extract value through the dividend they mostly receive, not through pay. For a minority investor, the practical read is that governance offers little independent restraint, but the dominant incentive — a large, cash-backed dividend the controllers share pro-rata — points the same way as the outside shareholder's, and there is no disclosed related-party leakage in the pay or the payout. The condition that would change that read is any shift in how the surplus is deployed — a related-party purchase, a larger and more discretionary portfolio, or a payout sized to the marks rather than to construction cash.

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Sum-of-the-Parts

At Rp775 (24 July 2026, market capitalisation about Rp2.3tn), PBSA looks cheap on the headline: 7.3x reported earnings, 2.5x book, a 7.7% dividend yield. But a third of that reported profit is an unrealized securities mark. Once the cash-and-securities stack is valued separately, the market is paying roughly 10x normalized construction earnings — a full multiple for a single-customer contractor — and the securities cushion that flattered the headline P/E has already thinned by about 40% in one quarter.

What the price is

Source: price per IDX daily close 24 Jul 2026; 3,000,000,000 shares and equity Rp929.23bn per FY2025 Annual Report [1]; Rp60 dividend per FY2025 results [2].

PBSA has 3,000,000,000 shares listed, of which 15,113,700 now sit in treasury after the early-2026 buyback, leaving roughly 2.985bn outstanding [3]. At Rp775 that is a market capitalisation near Rp2.33tn. Reported FY2025 net profit was Rp320.08bn and EPS Rp106.61, so the trailing multiple is 7.3x — the kind of number that flags a value screen [4]. The Rp60 per-share dividend declared for FY2025 lifts the yield to 7.7% [2]. On book value, equity of Rp929.23bn puts the stock at 2.5x [1].

The reported P/E is the wrong denominator. FY2025 net profit carried a Rp111.53bn unrealized fair-value gain on the securities portfolio and a Rp5.68bn realized gain; stripping both leaves construction-only net profit of about Rp202.9bn (Earnings Quality) [5]. On that base the whole company trades at 11.5x, not 7.3x.

Source: reported EPS Rp106.61 and net profit Rp320.08bn, FY2025 Financial Highlights [4]; normalized construction net Rp202.9bn derived from the FY2025 income statement [5].

Two stacks, not one number

The cleaner way to value PBSA is to separate what it owns from what it does. The company runs with effectively no interest-bearing debt, so its financial assets — cash plus the fair-value securities portfolio — are a stack that can be handed to shareholders or lost to a market move, independent of the construction business. At 31 December 2025 that stack was Rp473bn: Rp145.22bn of cash and Rp327.85bn of short-term investments [6]. Subtract that from the Rp2,325bn market capitalisation and the market is implicitly paying about Rp1,852bn for the construction operation itself — 9.1x its normalized Rp202.9bn of earnings, or 7.6x its Rp243.02bn of operating income [4].

That was the year-end picture. The most recent balance sheet is worse for the cushion. By 31 March 2026 the cash line had fallen to Rp64.43bn and the securities portfolio to Rp207.92bn — a combined Rp272bn, down Rp201bn in a single quarter [7]. On the current stack the same arithmetic values the construction business at about Rp2,053bn, or 10.1x normalized earnings and 8.4x operating income.

Source: market cap at Rp775 x 3.0bn shares; financial stack = cash plus short-term investments, FY2025 AR [6] and Q1 FY2026 statements [7]; construction stub = market cap less the stack.

The green block is the part of the price a buyer can, in principle, underwrite with a balance sheet. It shrank from a fifth of the market capitalisation to about an eighth in three months, as the quarter's Rp71.62bn portfolio loss and negative operating cash flow drained both cash and marks (Capital and Control). The low headline P/E rested partly on that cushion; the cushion is now materially smaller.

Source: cash and short-term investments, FY2025 AR [6] and Q1 FY2026 statements [7].

Is ten times fair for the construction stub

A single-customer contractor with a roughly 12-month backlog does not obviously deserve a full-market multiple, and 10x normalized earnings is not cheap for that risk profile. The case for it rests on two numbers. First, the construction business earns an exceptional return on the capital actually tied up in it: with the Rp473bn financial stack removed, operating equity at end-2025 was about Rp456bn, and Rp202.9bn of normalized profit on that base is a return above 40% [1]. The business is advance-funded and asset-light; it needs little capital to grow. Second, it is growing quickly: Q1 FY2026 operating income rose 59.8% year on year to Rp81.34bn on revenue up 46.8% [8]. Measured against a forward run-rate rather than trailing FY2025, the same price implies a lower multiple.

The evidence points to a construction stub priced for quality and growth rather than for its concentration risk. The strongest fact against that read is that the growth and the returns both depend on one conglomerate's palm-oil downstream capex (Palm Oil Capex): every customer above 10% of revenue and the entire disclosed order book is Sinar Mas / Golden Agri, and the backlog turns over annually with no multi-year visibility. A single lost capex cycle would compress both the earnings base and the multiple at once. What would change the read is order-book replenishment outside that group, or a durable second end-market — neither of which the filings yet show.

The price's own history is the clearest anchor

With no sell-side coverage and no consensus target, the most honest external reference is how the market itself has valued PBSA. Two years ago the stock traded around Rp370, a market capitalisation near Rp1.1tn — 5.2x the FY2024 earnings and 1.4x book. In the H2-2025 spike it reached a Rp1,500 close (Rp4.5tn), 14.1x earnings and 4.8x book, before collapsing [9]. Today's 7.3x reported and 2.5x book sits between the two, still roughly 40% above the pre-spike multiple.

Source: closing prices and market capitalisation from Share Performance Highlights, FY2025 AR [9]; earnings and equity per Financial Highlights [4].

The multiple has re-rated even after a 64% fall from the peak. That the price still trades on momentum as much as fundamentals is visible in the tape: it moved from Rp765 to Rp825 and back to Rp775 in the three sessions to 24 July 2026 on no disclosed news. A buyer here is not just paying for the construction business; they are paying a post-spike multiple set by a thin 16% float.

What the range depends on

Because the financial stack is close to a known quantity, the valuation is most sensitive to the multiple placed on the construction stub. Each additional turn of that multiple on Rp202.9bn of normalized earnings is worth about Rp68 per share. The table below holds the current Rp272bn financial stack fixed and varies the construction multiple.

Source: derived — construction value = Rp202.9bn normalized earnings x multiple; implied price = (construction value + Rp272bn financial stack) / 2.985bn shares [5].

At the current Rp775, the market is placing the construction business at almost exactly 10x. An 8x multiple — still a fair figure for a concentrated contractor — implies about Rp635, roughly 18% below the price; a growth-premium 12x implies about Rp907. The second sensitivity is the securities portfolio itself: at Rp207.92bn it is Rp70 per share, and Q1 FY2026 showed that number can swing by a third of its value in one quarter [7]. A reader who marks the portfolio conservatively and the construction stub at a concentration discount lands well below Rp775; one who capitalises the recent construction growth lands above it. The gap between those two views, not the headline 7.3x, is the valuation question.