Chapter 1

Two engines behind a record year

PT Paramita Bangun Sarana (PBSA) is a small, debt-free Indonesian contractor that builds palm-oil mills, refineries and jetties, almost entirely for companies in the Sinar Mas and Golden Agri palm-oil group. Its FY2025 profit of Rp320bn was a record, but roughly a third of pretax profit came not from construction — it came from unrealized gains on a Rp328bn portfolio of managed funds. This chapter maps the business and fixes the question the report is built to answer.

What PBSA is

Paramita Bangun Sarana was founded on 27 November 2002 and listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange on 28 September 2016, selling 300 million new shares [1]. It is a construction contractor whose expertise has been "particularly applied to projects related to the palm oil industry" — building the roads into plantations, the mills, the refineries, the tank farms and the jetties that move crude palm oil onto ships [2]. Around this core sits a small trading arm and a negligible building-management unit; construction was about 85% of FY2024 revenue.

That palm-oil focus is also a concentration. Every customer that individually exceeded 10% of FY2025 revenue belongs to the same industrial group: PT Sinar Mas Agro Resources and Technology, PT Soci Mas, PT Binasawit Abadipratama, PT Ivomas Tunggal and PT Sumber Indah Perkasa [3]. PBSA's order book, in other words, rises and falls with one ecosystem's decision to build palm-oil processing capacity.

Ownership is equally concentrated. Two private holding companies — PT Ascend Bangun Persada (46.16%) and PT Sigma Mutiara (37.56%) — hold 83.7% of the 3.0 billion shares between them, leaving a public float of 16.28% [4]. A thin float matters later, when the share price is discussed.

Source: FY2025 Annual Report, Financial Highlights [5] and Consolidated Statement of Profit or Loss [6]; ROE derived from reported net profit and equity.

The construction engine is lumpy

Project-based contracting does not compound smoothly, and PBSA's does not. Revenue has swung from Rp1,270bn in 2016 — the year it went public — down to a Rp279bn trough in 2021, then up to a fresh record of Rp1,591bn in 2025 [7]. A single large mill or tank-farm contract landing or completing in a given year moves the whole top line.

Source: reported consolidated income statements, FY2016–FY2025, per the FY2025 Annual Report three-year summary [8] and earlier filings.

The balance sheet that carries this volatility is unusually clean. At end-2025 PBSA held Rp145bn of cash and Rp328bn of short-term investments against total debt of about Rp19m — effectively no borrowings — on Rp929bn of equity [9]. Reported returns are high: FY2025 return on equity was 34% and the operating margin 15%.

Cash generation, though, is as lumpy as revenue. In FY2024 the company reported Rp215bn of net profit yet burned Rp43bn of operating cash as receivables and contract assets built up; in FY2025 operating cash flow swung to a positive Rp367bn [10]. Over a full cycle the cash arrives, but in any single year reported profit and cash can point in opposite directions — a working-capital pattern normal for percentage-of-completion contractors, and one worth watching in the years it diverges.

The second engine is a securities portfolio

The more distinctive feature of recent results sits below the operating line. In FY2025, operating income was Rp243bn, but profit before tax was Rp361bn — a Rp118bn gap [11]. Almost all of that gap is one line: a Rp111.5bn "gain on fair value change on investments" (Rp38.7bn in FY2024). It is an unrealized mark-to-market gain, not a sale, and it equals 31% of FY2025 pretax profit.

Source: FY2025 Annual Report, Consolidated Statement of Profit or Loss [12] and Financial Highlights [13]; non-operating income is profit before tax less operating income.

This non-operating engine is new at scale. The portfolio behind it — classified as "financial assets at fair value through profit or loss, held-for-trading" — grew from Rp89bn at end-2024 to Rp328bn at end-2025, nearly a quarter of total assets. It holds mostly managed funds: Nusadana Fixed Income, KPD Nusadana, Juara Capital and Nusadana Balanced Fund, plus a token equity stake [14]. One holding drives much of the gain: KPD Nusadana, a discretionary managed account, was revalued from Rp883.68 to Rp2,533.33 per unit over 2025 — a 187% mark-up on an unchanged 46.3 million units [15].

That is a large, illiquid, marked-to-model position contributing nearly a third of headline profit, and it deserves its own forensic look before the recent earnings trajectory is taken at face value. The pattern is not a one-off — the operating-to-pretax gap was even wider in FY2023, at Rp132bn — which makes the durability of these gains a live question rather than a footnote.

The stock: a thin float, a spike, and a round-trip

For most of its listed life PBSA traded as a sleepy micro-cap. Quarter-end closes sat between Rp280 and Rp370 through 2024. Then, in the second half of 2025, the shares moved sharply: the third-quarter close was Rp985 and the fourth-quarter close Rp1,500, with an intraday high of Rp2,160, lifting market capitalization to Rp4.5tn at year-end [16]. The exchange suspended trading in the stock for eleven days in September 2025 [17]. The move had the fingerprints of a thin-float re-rating rather than a change in the business.

Sources: quarter-end closes FY2024–FY2025 from the FY2025 Annual Report [18]; the July 2026 price is the latest market quote.

The spike has since reversed. The shares peaked near Rp2,360 in late January 2026 and, by 24 July 2026, had fallen to Rp775 — a round-trip that leaves the stock roughly where a fundamental investor might start. No sell-side analyst covers PBSA, so there is no consensus to anchor to. At Rp775 the market values the equity near Rp2.3tn, or about 7 times FY2025 earnings and 2.5 times book — cheap on trailing figures, but those figures include the portfolio gains discussed above, and the "earnings" they capitalize are partly a mark-to-market opinion.

The question this report answers

PBSA presents a genuine puzzle. It is a debt-free, cash-rich, high-return contractor trading at a single-digit trailing multiple with no analyst coverage — the profile value investors hunt for. It is also a contractor whose revenue depends on one industrial group's capex cycle, whose reported cash lags reported profit in the years they diverge, and whose record earnings have been lifted roughly a third by unrealized gains on a securities book that quadrupled in a year.

So the question the chapters that follow are built to answer is this: whether PBSA's record FY2024–25 profits represent a durable, repeatable construction franchise worth its modest multiple — or a lumpy, customer-concentrated contractor whose headline earnings have been flattered to record levels by unrealized portfolio gains, leaving a buyer paying for profit that construction alone did not earn. Everything that follows tests one side of that question or the other.